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Abstract 
At the start of 2014, the Russian Federation had experienced several years of decelerating 
growth rates as a result of weak investment, poor governance, and failed structural 
reforms. During 2014, the dual shocks of rapidly declining oil prices and increasingly 
stringent international sanctions led to significant financial instability, as Russian firms lost 
access to international markets and net capital outflows accelerated. As part of the 
response to this crisis, the Russian government unveiled a RUB 1 trillion (US $17.2 billion) 
bank capital support program, which it later revised down to RUB 838 billion. The 
program, operated by the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA), exchanged government bonds 
(OFZs) for either preferred shares or subordinated debt from large banks, banks affected 
by the sanctions, or major regional banks. The DIA required banks to increase lending to 
certain sectors in the real economy by 1% a month for three years, as well as freezing 
executive compensation and raising private capital of 50% of the amount of support 
provided by the DIA. The DIA concluded agreements with 34 banks for the exchange of 
RUB 838 billion in OFZs, with over RUB 628 billion in OFZs still in place at those 
institutions as of October 2019. Government auditors reported that the program 
transferred RUB 261.3 billion to the federal budget by the end of 2019, as a result of eleven 
banks ending their participation in the program, with the four banks merging with others. 
The Russian government claimed the intervention was a success, noting that lending to the 
real economy increased by 65%.  
Keywords: broad-based capital injection; broad-based, capital injection, Russia, Deposit 
Insurance Agency, recapitalization  
  
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based capital injection programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 






At a Glance 
In the second half of 2014, Russia faced 
two significant shocks to its economic 
system: an extreme decline in oil prices, 
and international sanctions in response 
to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. As a 
result, the Russian ruble faced serious 
depreciative pressure, causing net capital 
outflows of 8% of GDP and declining 
asset prices which generated liquidity 
issues for Russian banks. The 
depreciation of the ruble negatively 
affected the value of Russian banks’ risk-
weighted capital, making it harder for 
Russian banks to operate. The Russian 
financial sector reported after-tax losses 
from December 2014-May 2015 (IMF 
2015). 
According to the International Monetary 
Fund, the sanctions placed on Russia 
would decrease real GDP by 1-1.5% in 
the short term, and possibly cause it to 
decline by up to 9% in the medium term. 
Russian companies lost access to 
international markets—which increased 
financing costs—and had to turn to 
Russian banks to finance their external 
debts—banks which struggled to provide 
the necessary financing (IMF 2015). 
In response to the worsening economic 
conditions, the Russian government 
initiated several measures in fiscal and 
monetary policy measures, including a 
bank capital support program to help 
ailing banks. The bank capital support program, announced in December 2014, sought to 
recapitalize the Russian banking sector with RUB 1 trillion (US $17.2 billion) set aside for 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: The bank capital support program intended to 
provide capital to systematically important banks 
affected by declining oil prices and international 
sanctions, as well as increase lending to select sectors of 
the real economy. 
Announcement Date December 2014 
Operational Date April 27, 2015  
Sunset Date Not applicable 
Legal Authority Authorized by Law No. 451-
FZ 
Program Size Initially one trillion rubles 
but revised downwards to 
838 billion rubles  
Usage 34 banks received a total of 
RUB 838 billion in OFZs 
Outcomes RUB 628.6 billion of 
preferred shares and 
subordinated debt remain 
outstanding with the 
government as of the end of 
2020; four banks merged 
and two lost their banking 
licenses  
Key Features Capital injection exchanged 
for preferred shares in some 
cases; maturity for 
subordinated debt 10-20 
years and in some cases 
could be greater than 50 
years 
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the program, later revised down to RUB 838 billion (IMF 2015).3 The Deposit Insurance 
Agency (DIA), a state-run corporation, administered the bank capital support program by 
exchanging government bonds (OFZs) for the preferred shares and Tier 1 debt of partly 
state-owned banks and banks facing international sanctions. Additionally, the DIA swapped 
OFZs for the Tier 2 subordinated debt of the remaining eligible private banks (IMF 2015). 
The Russian government allowed large banks (those with at least RUB 25 billion in capital), 
banks facing international sanctions, and major regional banks to participate in the bank 
capital support program (IMF 2015). The DIA defined a major regional bank as a bank with 
at least RUB 5 billion in capital, with only the largest bank in each constituent entity of the 
Russian Federation included in this list (DIA 2015). A bank could receive capital support of 
up to 25% of its capital if it committed to increase lending in specific sectors by one percent 
a month, froze executive compensation and payroll, and raised its own capital by an 
additional 50% of the amount of the government’s capital injection (IMF 2015). 
The Board of Directors of the DIA operated the bank capital support program, dependent 
on Russian government approval, while the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation 
(ACRF) provided frequent audits of the program (DIA 2015; ACRF 2020).  
Summary Evaluation 
In total, the DIA purchased RUB 838 billion rubles of preferred shares and subordinated 
debt from 34 banks under the bank capital support program, as of December 31, 2019 (DIA 
2020). That total included: (1) RUB 298 billion in subordinated debt with maturity dates in 
2025, 2027, 2029, 2032, and 2034, from 27 private banks; (2) RUB 13 billion in 
subordinated debt with a maturity of at least 50 years from three banks; and (3) RUB 527 
billion in preferred shares from four partly state-owned banks (ACRF 2020). The DIA 
funded all of these purchases by issuing OFZs to the supported banks. 
Twelve banks failed to meet the credit growth target at points during the three-year period 
and paid RUB 771 million in fines to the DIA as a result. Three banks violated the condition 
to self-raise funds and paid RUB 290 million in resultant fines. Two banks exceeded the 
payroll restrictions and thus remitted RUB 351 million to the federal budget (ACRF 2020). 
Between the start of the program and the end of 2019, 11 banks ended their participation 
due to various reasons such as reorganizing through merger, exchanging claims for 
ordinary shares of the banks, and transferring preferred shares to the Treasury of the 
Russian government (DIA 2020; ACRF 2020). See Figure 1 for the size of the program over 
time.  
As of December 31, 2019, over RUB 628.6 billion in preferred shares and subordinated 
debt remained outstanding with the Russian government, including the 2.2 billion of 
subordinated debt to two banks whose licenses were revoked in 2017 and 2018 (these 
 
3 1 RUB = US$ 0.01723 on December 31, 2014 (Bloomberg).  
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claims will be satisfied through bankruptcy proceedings) (DIA 2020). The DIA has 
transferred RUB 261.3 billion to the federal budget as of October 1, 2019, as a result of 
compensation for lost coupon income, dividends on preferred shares, interest on 
subordinated loans, and fines due to noncompliance with contractual obligations (ACRF 
2020). The Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, a government auditor, declared 
that the bank capital support program was successful because banks made it through the 
crisis period, while lending to the real economy increased by 65% (compared to only 11% 
for the overall banking sector) (Vilenovich 2019).  
Figure 1: Assets of Bank Capital Support Program (in RUB billions) 
 
Sources: Deposit Insurance Agency 2016; Deposit Insurance Agency 2017; Deposit Insurance Agency 2018; 
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Russian Federation Context 2014 - 2015 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$2.077 trillion in 2014 
$1.366 trillion in 2015 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$14,096 in 2014 
$9,313 in 2015 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt) 
 









Size of banking system 
 
$643 billion in 2014 
$847 billion in 2015 
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP 
 
30.94% in 2014 
61.96% in 2015 
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial 
system 
 
93% in 2014 
96% in 2015 
5-bank concentration of banking system 
 
42% in 2014 
55% in 2015 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
0% in 2014 
0% in 2015 
Government ownership of banking system 
58.5% of assets in state-
owned banks in 2014 
58.6% of assets in state-
owned banks in 2015 
Existence of deposit insurance 
100% insurance on 
deposits up to $21,387 in 
2013 (exchange rate 
volatility complicates this 
estimate) 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 
Deposit Insurance Dataset. 
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Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: The Russian government provided additional capital support 
through separate targeted programs; it also provided temporary regulatory 
forbearance with respect to loan loss provisions and asset valuation.  
Two additional provisions intended to stabilize the Russian banking sector accompanied 
the bank capital support program. Up to 10% of the assets of the National Wealth Fund 
(0.5% of GDP) could be used to finance large infrastructure projects through banks (IMF 
2015). Additionally, the legislation permitted the Central Bank of Russia to inject capital 
into the largest state-owned bank, Sberbank, which was thus made ineligible for the bank 
capital support program and held approximately 30% of the system’s assets at the time. 
The government also replaced subordinated loans it had provided to three state-owned 
banks during the Global Financial Crisis with preferred shares of up to 0.4% of GDP (IMF 
2016). 
The Russian government implemented several temporary regulatory forbearance 
measures, affecting the valuation of securities and foreign exchange assets. Additionally, 
there were measures designed to provide flexibility for loan loss provisioning related to 
armed conflict and international sanctions (IMF 2016).  
2. Legal Authority: Law No. 451-FZ authorized the Deposit Insurance Agency to 
recapitalize the banking sector through the exchange of government bonds for 
subordinated debt and preferred shares on December 25, 2014.  
The lower house of the Russian Federal Assembly, the State Duma, passed Law No. 451-FZ 
on December 19, 2014, and the upper house, the Federation Council, approved the measure 
on December 25, 2014. This law allowed the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) to 
recapitalize Russian banks by transferring government bonds (OFZ) for subordinated loans 
and bonds (Federation Council 2014).  
3. Communication: The DIA released annual reports, as well as timely 
announcements of specific recapitalizations.  
The DIA released annual reports that provided updates on the progress of the bank capital 
support program. Additionally, the regulation of the DIA required it to publicly announce 
on its website any transfer of government bonds within five working days. This 
announcement included the total par value of the transferred government bonds, the term 
of the subordinated debt, and the interest rate on the subordinated debt (DIA 2015). 
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4. Governance/Administration: The DIA required monthly reports from the 
participating banks to ensure compliance with the conditions in the contracts.  
The DIA required banks that received capital support from the DIA to submit monthly 
reports to the DIA on their required credit growth targets, with quarterly reports on the 
other conditions included in the capital support agreements (DIA 2015).  
The Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation (ACRF), an audit institution within the 
Russian government, released quarterly reports on the progress of the bank capital 
support program (ACRF 2020). The ACRF did not approve of the DIA’s handling of reports, 
raising concerns of inaccurate or incorrect data in their reports. In response, the DIA 
devised a new methodology for report preparation in December 2016 (ACRF 2017a). 
However, these forms were not approved by the Central Bank of Russia and the ACRF 
requested that the DIA implement sanctions on banks that provided inaccurate data. 
Altogether in 2016-17, the DIA (by its Board’s decisions) implemented financial sanctions 
(fines) on banks that did not comply with the conditions in the contracts for the total 
amount of 822.9 million RUB. The fines paid by the banks were transferred by the DIA to 
the federal budget (DIA 2018).  
5. Governance/Administration: The Board of Directors of the DIA operated the 
bank capital support program, subject to government approval.  
The DIA operated the bank capital support program (IMF 2016). The Board of Directors of 
the DIA determined eligibility of banks to participate in the program, pending approval 
from the government of the Russian Federation, which consists of the Prime Minister and 
their deputies (DIA 2015). It appears that the vast majority of decisions approved by the 
Board of Directors required governmental authorization. The Board of Directors is 
comprised of seven representatives from the federal government, five representatives of 
the Central Bank of Russia, and the director general of the DIA (IMF 2016).  
6. Size, Timing: The Russian government initially allocated RUB 1 trillion to the 
bank capital support program, although it later decreased the total to RUB 830 
billion.  
At the time of announcement, the Russian government allocated RUB 1 trillion (1.2% of 
GDP) to the bank capital support program, although it would later reduce the allocation to 
RUB 838 billion as a result of lower capital need estimates (IMF 2015). The other RUB 162 
billion went instead to nonfinancial enterprises (IMF 2016).  
Eligible banks, excluding regional banks, had until June 1, 2015, to accept the capital 
injection offer from the DIA, and the process should have been finalized by November 1, 
2015. Regional banks had until April 1, 2016, to finalize their participation in the bank 
capital support program (DIA 2015). Some banks received more than one capital injection 
throughout the existence of the program.  
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7. Source of the Injections: The Russian government issued new bonds (OFZs) and 
exchanged them for the securities held by banks.  
The funding for the bank capital support program came in the form of government bonds 
(OFZs) included in the 2014 federal budget (IMF 2015). 
8. Eligible Institutions: The Russian government made large banks, banks affected 
by international sanctions, and main regional banks eligible for the voluntary 
bank capital support program, dependent on compliance with certain 
conditions.  
There were three main categories of banks eligible to participate in the bank capital 
support program: 
• Banks with at least RUB 25 billion in capital (27 banks applicable, 43% of system 
assets) 
• Banks that were directly or indirectly affected by the economic sanctions (four 
banks) 
• main regional lenders (10 banks), which the DIA defines as having at least RUB 5 
billion in capital with only the largest bank in each constituent entity of the 
Russian Federation included in this list (IMF 2015; DIA 2015). 
Despite Sberbank being technically eligible under the first category, the bank capital 
support program excluded it, since it was majority-owned by the Central Bank of Russia. 
Partly state-owned banks could participate in the program with eight of the 27 banks in the 
first category falling under this classification and holding 64% of the capital in the entire 
category (IMF 2015).  
Beyond the categorization of eligible institutions, all banks needed to be in full compliance 
with the prudential regulations of the Central Bank of Russia at the time of the capital 
injection. Furthermore, consumer loans had to be below 40% of total assets, although 
legislation raised this limit to 50% in July 2015 (IMF 2016).  
On February 2, 2015, the Russian government approved the 27 banks in the first category 
for participation in the program. The government approved four banks affected by 
economic sanctions on May 13, 2015. Lastly, the government authorized ten regional banks 
to participate in the program on August 10, 2015, with RUB 8.47 billion in government 
bonds allocated to the regional banks (DIA 2016). In total, the DIA preliminarily designated 
over RUB 856 billion to the banks approved for participation. However, only 34 banks 
would conclude agreements with the DIA to receive capital support (DIA 2020). 
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9. Individual Participation Limits: Banks could not receive more than 25% of their 
own capital as of January 1, 2015. 
The capital injection to an individual bank could not exceed 25% of the bank’s own capital 
as of January 1, 2015, unless otherwise established by the Board of Directors. In cases 
when participants of the recapitalization program belonged to the same banking group, the 
mother bank of the group determined the amount of funds/bonds that were provided to 
each, within the limits established by the government for each bank. The DIA regulated that 
every bank would receive the same percentage of its own capital in support, which the 
Board of Directors would determine (DIA 2015).  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted that every bank would be receiving a capital 
injection equal to 25% of the bank’s capital and criticized this condition as not well 
targeted to individual bank’s needs (IMF 2015). However, the documentation from the DIA 
stated that the capital support could not exceed 25% of the pre-existing capital, rather than 
a set 25% injection (DIA 2015).  
10. Capital Characteristics: The DIA exchanged government bonds for preferred 
shares (for partly state-owned banks and banks facing international sanctions) 
and subordinated debt (for other private banks). 
Initially, the DIA only offered to swap OFZs for subordinated debt of the same maturity. 
However, most banks did not show interest in participating in the bank capital support 
program based on that offer (Vilenovich 2015). In response, the DIA, after the special law 
amendments, allowed two additional procedures for recapitalization in April 2015: 
exchanging OFZs for subordinated debt with a maturity of more than 50 years, eligible for 
extensions, and swapping OFZs for the preferred shares of banks. While these two options 
were more attractive to the banks, they posed additional risks to the federal budget due to 
irregular receipts and shortfalls in budget revenues compared to what was initially 
proposed (Vilenovich 2015). The vast majority of banks ended up utilizing the original 
capital injection design. 
For partly state-owned banks and banks affected by sanctions, the DIA exchanged OFZs for 
preferred shares (Tier 1 capital), while the remainder of the banks swapped subordinated 
debt (Tier 2 capital). Over 60% of the funds in the bank capital support program went to 
partly state-owned banks (IMF 2016).  
11. Dividends/Interest Rates: The Board of Directors of the DIA determined the 
interest rate for subordinated debt.  
The interest rate on the subordinated debt exchanged for OFZs was set at one percent per 
year greater than the interest rate on the OFZs themselves (IMF 2016). For the banks 
swapping subordinated debt with a maturity of at least 50 years, the Board of Directors of 
the DIA would determine the interest rate on the subordinated debt within three months of 
the maturity of the OFZs (DIA 2015). This date has not occurred yet for any of the banks 
participating in the bank capital support program, so the specific process for this rate 
determination is unclear as of this writing.  
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12. Allocation of losses for existing stakeholders: The bank capital support program 
did not seem to directly allocate losses to specific stakeholders.  
Research into the Russian bank capital support program did not find any provisions for the 
allocation of losses for existing stakeholders, beyond the generally dilutive effects of the 
government injections.  
13. Debt Restructuring Plan: The bank capital support program did not require any 
special debt restructuring plans.  
The bank capital support program did not include any debt restructuring conditions.  
14. Fate of Existing Board and Management: Participating banks faced limits on 
executive compensation and overall wages.  
A bank could not increase the compensation of its executives or raise its overall wage bill 
for the first three years after recapitalization. The DIA Board of Directors decided the size 
of the fine (DIA 2015). 
Two banks exceeded the payroll restrictions and thus remitted RUB 351 million to the 
federal budget (ACRF 2020). 
15. Other Conditions: The capital support provided by the DIA included required 
credit growth targets in certain sectors, as well as the bank’s commitment to 
increase its own capital by 50% of the capital support.  
The bank capital support program imposed some conditions on recipients of OFZs. First, 
banks had to commit to increase the total amount of lending in select sectors by at least one 
percent per month in the first three years after the recapitalization. These sectors included 
housing, small- and medium-sized businesses, agriculture, manufacturing, construction, 
and others (DIA 2015). The IMF criticized this provision, stating that specific credit growth 
targets would increase credit risks and cause poor credit allocation (IMF 2015). 
A participating bank also needed to pledge to increase its own capital by at least 50% of the 
capital injection over the duration of the subordinated loans. The DIA noted that this could 
be accomplished by issuing new shares and/or by retaining at least 75% of the bank’s 
profits. This did not apply to partly state-owned banks. Violations of any conditions of the 
program could result in an annual fine of up to 2% of the capital support (DIA 2015).  
Twelve banks failed to meet the credit growth target at points during the three-year period 
and paid RUB 771 million in fines to the DIA as a result. Three banks violated the condition 
to privately raise funds and thus paid RUB 290 million in fines (ACRF 2020). 
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16. Exit Strategy: The DIA did not announce a predetermined exit strategy for the 
bank capital support program.  
The original legislation and announcement of the bank capital support program did not 
indicate a set deadline or exit strategy. However, the required DIA disclosures of capital 
injections did report the maturities of the subordinated debt being purchased. The most 
recent capital injection took place in May 2017 (DIA 2018).  
17. Amendments to relevant regulation: The bank capital support program did not 
appear to include any significant amendments to relevant regulation. 
Research into the bank capital support program did not find any important amendments to 
relevant regulation.   
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